| Thursday, July 21, 2011.  Chaos and violence continue, Jalal Talabani  prepares to host another house party, Political Stalemate II continues, US  officials think discussions about the US military staying in Iraq could go on  for months, and more.     Kevin Pina: And now we are joined once again by our special  correspondent Mahdi Nazemroaya direct from Tripoli, Libya.  Mahdi, welcome back  to Flashpoints on Pacifica  Radio.   Mahdi Nazemroaya:  Thank you, Kevin, good to hear your voice  again.   Kevin Pina: Well listen, overnight everything has changed. It  wasn't but yesterday and two days ago that the Obama administration and France  and the NATO coalition were saying 'No solution to this unless Muammar Gaddafi  stepped down.'  Today they've completely reversed their position and changed  their tune.  They're saying now that that is not a prerequisite to negotiating a  deal.  You actually called it on the ground yesterday.   Mahdi Nazemroaya:  Yes, yes, Kevin, I've seen the negotiators  they've been sending. And to be very frank with you, there are journalists here  who are acting in the position of feelers, let's say. The journalists here --  Okay, let me qualify what I'm going to say.  One of the reasons I came to Libya  was as a member of a fact finding mission for the current events in Libya.  This  is part of an international group.  People came from all over including  ex-Congress member Cynthia McKinney.  People have come from all over western  Europe, Africa, all over the world, Canada included. And studying the media has  been a point of mine.  My notebook was actually mysteriously disappeared, so my  original documents disappeared in the Rixos Hotel which is where the  international journalists stay. But I want to point out that a lot of the  journalists are way far more than just journalists.  They're here for other  things like mapping social relationships.  I even suspect they're trying to  see how they can find Gaddafi and report it back to Brussels or Washington for  assassination.  Now going back to what --   Kevin Pina:  Woah, woah, woah, Mahdi.  That's a very serious  allegation.  You're saying that journalists there are actually acting as  espionage agents for certain foreign governments.     Mahdi Nazemroaya:  Yes, yes.  I'm very serious about what I said.   I believe even yesterday I told you that a German gentleman was kicked out for  suspicion of spying.  Like I'm being very cautious with my words here but he  came here presenting himself as an expert on Depleted Uranium.  He had no  qualifications whatsoever. He came to the fact finding commission. He brought  machinery with him that he claimed could find DU.  It was right after the really  strange bombings of the previous night which I said the bombing was not like  before. And he was very eager to see the weapons used and if any weapons  remained.  And he insisted on going to the sites. And how they caught him was he  made some stories that didn't follow through. Yes, I'm dead serious about this.   The media center has been watching journalists.  They're been journalists who've  applied to come here with fake passports. I haven't seen these obviously but  I've been told that passport pictures are not even proper. They've looked up  some of these journalists' backgrounds.  It does not even concur with the  nationality or the place of birth they've presented.   So, yes, I'm saying that  they sent spies.  Whether you want to say CNN, Sky News -- The mainstream  media's here far more than just to cover the news, they make the news. Number  one, they make the news.  They're not here to report the news at all. So I'm  going to emphasize that.  They're here to make the news. They've sent [CNN's]  Ivan Watson from their Istanbul bureau. I was at the fact finding commission  when he came.  And they sent Jomana Karadsheh [also CNN]. She's a producer based  in Baghdad. Look, I'm going to point it out. She told us that she's Lebanese at  the fact finding commission but her background says she's Jordanian.  So she was  dishonest right there.  The questions they brought were not about finding facts,  they were more like negotiating points. These people are here on a very ominous  standing and it has to do with the fact that the Obama administration, Barack  Hussein Obama, Hillary Clinton and NATO are on very weak footing.  France's  prime minister -- this is an official position when France's prime minister or  president make these statements -- said Gaddafi could stay.  They are in a very  weak position and everybody in Libya and in Libyan capitol Tripoli on the  Mediterranean Coast knows that full well.    Turning to Iraq, Ed O'Keefe and Aziz Alwan (Washington Post)  report  that Iraqi and American officials are both stating that the  'deadline' for informing the US that they want the US military to stay will not  be kept.  That deadline was Jalal Talabani's deadline.  Set and announced by  Talabani.  Among the problems O'Keefe and Alwan state is that there is some  speculation, on the American side, that "a request might not come until March."   For those late to the party, the Status Of Forces Agreement extended the US  military occupation of Iraq by three years -- unlike the UN mandates which had  been used previously and only covered one year at a time.  December 31st of this  year, the SOFA (negotiated by the Bush administration) expires.  If it is not  extended it can be replaced with a new agreement or all US forces (except those  protecting the sprawling US Embassy in Baghdad and the US consulates sprouting  up all over Iraq) can leave.    The White House's primary plan is to reach an agreement and keep the US  military in Iraq as is -- meaning under the Pentagon.  The back-up plan is  sliding them over to the State Dept and keeping them in that way.  With Scott Horton (Antiwar Radio),  John Glaser  discussed  the US military staying in Iraq.  Excerpt:  John Glaser: Whatever sort of contingent forces remain in Iraq --  there surely will be some amount -- they're going to be in combatant capacity  despite the denials of US officials that are saying right now they're going to  be noncombat and so on and so forth.  They will have to continue to fight  against an insurgency whose main aim is to get them out of the country.  There's  no -- There's really no indication that the national security state in America  will treat Iraq any differently than they've treated the many other countries  which they continue to okay.  Why would they treat it any differently than South  Korea where we still have 50,000 some odd troops.  There's just no indication  that they would.  And so we need to either come to grips with the fact that they  will be there and they will continue fighting or -- I'm not really sure what the  alternative is.   Scott Horton: Yeah, well, I'm already making bumper sticks that  say: "End The Iraq War: Ron Paul 2012."   John Glaser:  Right.   Scott Horton:  Cause Obama sure ain't doing it.    John Glaser: No, absolutely not. I'm glad that Ron Paul is running  again. I think he sort of invigoarted a d a distinct class of antiwar and I  think he'll build on that this time around and we'll get some more colleagues in  that endevaor.     JUDY WOODRUFF: Let's go to some of  the international issues you touched on very quickly. You want to bring troops  home. What should the U.S. footprint be internationally? What is the U.S. role  in the world?       REP. RON PAUL: Well, it should be  a footprint of trade and friendship, as we were advised and as the Constitution  permits. The footprint shouldn't be a military footprint. It shouldn't be -       JUDY WOODRUFF: So bring -       REP. RON PAUL: The footprint we're  leaving now - our drone missiles dropping bombs and killing innocent civilians,  launched from the United States with computers. That's not the kind of footprint  I want.       JUDY WOODRUFF: Afghanistan. How  quickly would you bring the troops home?       REP. RON PAUL: As quick as the ships could get there. It's insane on  what we're doing. And I'll tell you one thing about this business about the  military: We just had a quarterly report, and they listed all the money that all  the candidates got from the military. I got twice as much as all the other  candidates put together on the Republican side, and even more than Obama got,  which tells me that these troops want to come home as well because they know  exactly what I'm talking about.
 
   Roy Gutman (McClatchy Newspapers) reported  earlier this week on Kirkuk, "Nowhere, Iraqi and U.S. officials say, is the  argument for keeping American troops in Iraq past Dec. 31 stronger than in  Kirkuk." He quotes stating the Governor of Kirkuk Najmeldeen Kereem, "The Iraqi  security forces do not have the ability to secure Iraq's borders, its airspace  or its sole seaport in Basra."  The governor wants the US military to stay  on.   While Kirkuk might want the US to stay on, supposedly the KRG (Kurdistan  Regional Government of Iraq) will be keeping US troops.  Al Rafidayn reports  the Iraqi  president gave an interview to China Central Television in which he explained  that the Kurdistan region is planning to keep US forces. And what of outside the  Kurdistan region? In the rest of Iraq? Well there are a few problems, Jalal  explained. See Iraqi has trouble protecting itself. It can't, he declared,  protect its own air space, the land or the sea. I'm confused, what does that  leave? By air, land or sea. What else is there?  How does that passage in the US  Marines' Hymn go?  From the Halls of Montezuma To the shores of Tripoli We fight our country's battles In the air, on land, and sea
 What else is there?
   I guess we could go Wiccan and talk the four corners?  Earth, Air, Water  and Fire?  So Jalal would be saying that Iraq has the capacity to protect the  fire?   Who knows but it's pretty clear that if you're the president of the country  and you're maintaining your forces can protect your country . . . except by  land, air and water, you've just tossed out a huge "but" and, no, your forces  can't protect your country.  (Or, at least, you don't think they can.) To keep the US military in Iraq, Jalal Talabani hid behind "trainers."  That's the lie that the Iraqi government currently thinks it can trick the Iraqi  people with. The US will remain in "a limited number" as "trainers." Strange. I  don't see how "trainers" can protect your air space, or your waters, or your  land.  Al  Sabaah also notes  Talabani's non-stop use of "trainers."  Phil Stewart (Reuters) notes , "Legal  safeguards for U.S. troops could become a major stumbling block to any potential  deal with Iraq to keep some American forces in the country beyond a year-end  withdrawal deadline."  Nizar Latif (The National) reported at  the end of last month that a number of Shi'ites were worried about a possible US  departure and fear that civil war could return and they worry about the Mahdi  militia of Moqtada al-Sadr: "Critics now worry that the militia, which  supporters claim can call up 150,000 fighters will pick up weapons if a new  security vacuum opens up when Iraq's army and police take over the departs."  Moqtada al-Sadr made many threats to rain down fire and brimstone should the US  military stay in Iraq.  Then he announced he wouldn't oppose such a decision.   NPR's Kelly McEvers (All     KELLY McEVERS: This is the issue with Sadr's organization. Despite  its new image as a political player, it still maintains a militant wing that  stands ready to threaten or even fight its rivals. In the case of Hezbollah in  Lebanon, the ostensible reason for keeping guns is to resist Israel. For Sadr,  it's to resist the U.S. But what happens when the enemy occupier leaves? Here's  Thanassis Cambanis again.    Professor THANASSIS. CAMBANIS: If the logic of resistance is what  defines you as a movement, you're going to have a lot of trouble shifting to  some other footing when the enemy you resist is gone.      McEVERS: That's why following the Hezbollah model too closely might  eventually be Sadr's undoing, Cambanis says. Two decades after its civil war,  Lebanon remains volatile and divided, and Hezbollah, he says, is losing  credibility. In the short term, though, Cambanis says, as long as Iraq's weak  and incomplete government remains unable to provide security and basic services,  Muqtada al-Sadr will remain a reasonable alternative.      Staying on the topic of Moqtada al-Sadr, we have maintained that he would  back down on his 'vow' to reform the Mahdi militia to attack US soldiers.  The  'vow' (empty threat) was similar to ones he had made before and not followed  through on and there was also the issue of hs long stay in Iran while he was  supposedly a 'leader' to 'his people.'  More and more US, European and Arab  opinion (intelligence and diplomatic community) was that Moqtada had lost hold  of 'his people' and was at a very weak point -- one similar to 2008 when the  Bush administration elected to attack him (with Nouri joining in) and allow him  to play 'dangerous rebel' and up his prestige and 'cred.'  By remaining out of  Iraq after being seen as strong (after the 2008 attack), he lost what he'd  gained.  That's what we based our opinion on.     Events have backed up that view.   Gareth Porter has a different take on  why Moqtada changed his mind.  He explains it in his article "What Is Sadr's Game on Future US  Troop Presence " (IPS  via  Dissident Voice ) which we've noted twice  this week.  And he explained it in his conversation with Scott Horton  (Antiwar Radio ).  We noted that interview  twice this week.  Read  his piece but my summary of it is that Moqtada realized he will be the next  prime minister and is now interested in perserving the system and not destroying  it.  Gareth Porter could be correct. The opinion we've offered here could be  completely wrong.  But Gareth's opinion really doesn't make sense.  And even  Scott Horton seems to sense that as he returns to that topic (such as in the  interview we noted earlier).  It's possible that Moqtada had an about face on  this because Jalal Talabani, who's been meeting with everyone, pointed out the  details Gareth presents.  And hearing that from Talabani, Moqtada did an about  face.  For Gareth's version to be correct, it appears to require someone points  out to Moqtada all that 'will happen.'  If Moqtada had come to the realization  on his own, the sudden about face makes no sense.   So maybe something like that happened.  Gareth could be correct.  But I  don't think it makes sense and I'm sticking with what we've argued for months.   In that scenario, Moqtada has little to command because his refusal to keep  'skin in the game' by staying in Iraq, loosened his hold on his organization and  all of its aspects.  That hypothesis may be backed up by Moqtada's own remarks  that he had to bring the Mahdi militia under control.  This is again hit upon  today in a report by Suadad al-Salhy  (Reuters) :  Anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army has spawned dozens of  renegade splinter groups which frequently assassinate Iraqi officials on behalf  of foreign sponsors, Sadrist and security officials say.  [. . .] A popular Shi'ite cleric who leads the militia as well as his own  political bloc, Sadr has repudiated the splinter groups, describing them as  "murderers" and "criminals", and has called on Iraqi security forces and tribes  to expel them. "They have turned into mercenary groups which have no ideology or  specific agenda. They are more like contract killers," said Major-General Hassan  al-Baidhani, chief of staff for Baghdad's security operations  command.   While Moqtada spent the last years in Iran, time did not stand still and  common sense will tell you that if Ida is the leader but Ida's out of the county  and Jose, Mia and Bill have to do all the wok in country -- including risking  arrest, including risking death -- Jose, Mia and Bill aren't going to be  thrilled when Ida pops back into the country three years later and expects  everyone to listne to her.  Moqtada can't run a 'revolution' by remote.   Gareth Porter may be right and I may be wrong.  Wouldn't be the first or  last time that I was wrong.  But the yarn being told does not add up and that's  why Scott Horton's trying to suss it out in his conversation with John Glaser.   That's why he keeps returning to it trying to figure out what Moqtada is  thinking.  Because it doesn't add up.   Why the sudden turn around by Moqtada?  In Gareth's version it's because  Moqtada realized he would be the next prime minister in a couple of years and  realized he couldn't afford to tear down the system he would command. Okay.   Well why did Moqtada all the sudden realize that?  Every step on the ladder begs  another question because on the most basic level -- human nature -- it does not  make sense.  We've excerpted from Gareth's article and we included lengthy  quotes on this from his conversation with Scott Horton.  There's a link to his  piece several paragraphs up. I'm not trying to distort what he's saying.  But  what he's saying doesn't currently make sense. It may be missing a step or it  may be invalid.  I don't know.  But my opinion is that Moqtada lost control of  his group -- and we've argued that repeatedly pointing to the low turnout for  parades and Moqtada's sudden decision to turn a parade into a march by his armed  supporters.  Moqtada's own remarks appear to back up that he's lost control (but  his remarks indicate also that he thinks he can take back control -- maybe he  can). At present, he really shouldn't matter but he continues to be a focus.   Largely because he's a press created object -- like a bad actor who sleeps with  his director to get that big break and gets the Vanity Fair cover and  then, two to three years later, people ask, "What ever happened to . . ." and  "What did anyone ever see in . . ."  (For those playing guessing games, that  actually describes two actors on the cover of Vanity Fair in the last  two decades.)  At some point, maybe an interviewer will ask him if he's still  relevant?  Who knows.  But he's taken himself out of the conversation of should  Iraq keeps US troops or not by his own statements.
   Dar Addustour reports Jalal's got  another house party planned. And that they will again discuss implementing the  Erbil Agreement but that Iraqiya (led by Ayad Allawi) is making warning noises  about what might happen if the agreement is not implemented (this agreement was  signed off on in November and ended Political Stalemate I). Al  Mada adds  that Iraqiya is floating the prospect of a vote of  no confidence in the current government. What does that mean?  A call for early  elections.  The country is in Political Stalemate II and  Reidar Visser (Carnegie  Endowment)  offers these thoughts on it: When Iraqi politicians finally formed a new  government in December 2010, nine months after the parliamentary elections, many  voices in the international community were congratulatory. Observers emphasized  that the Iraqis had managed to create an "inclusive government" in which all the  different ethno-sectarian groups in the country were represented. Critics of the  deal that led to the formation of the second government of Prime Minister Nouri  al-Maliki pointed out that it simply papered over persisting conflicts among  Iraqi politicians. It also produced an oversized, ineffective, and unstable  government with lots of unnecessary, bogus ministries (including such portfolios  as civil society and the southern marshlands), whereas ministries that were  truly needed, especially relating to national security, remained  unfilled. Eight months on, it seems the critics got it right: the  government remains incomplete and lacks key ministers for the interior and  defense, whereas the strategic policy council (celebrated by the United States  as a key power-sharing instrument of the government-formation deal) has yet to  even be formed. Much of 2011 has been spent agreeing on three unnecessary  deputies for the ceremonial presidential office (one of whom has already  resigned), while progress on the debate between the Kurdistan Regional  Government and Baghdad over oil exports has been limited to a pragmatic  agreement to export from two fields -- and the pending parliamentary agreement  on oil and gas laws still seems a long way off.      And yet we constantly hear half-truths and fantasies of 'progress' in  Iraq.  Sometimes 'progess' is nothing but a repeating PR stunt.  Case in point,  Al  Sabaah reports  that Iraq's Museum will be opening in the next  three months. And there's a nice little picture of the museum. We do love it  when the museum's 'opening' is in the news. Remember February 24,  2009 : "As for when the rest of  Iraq will be able to see the museum, that's unclear. Iraqi guards Monday  afternoon told journalists it would be a couple of months," notes the Los Angeles Times' Babylon & Beyond  (credited that way here and in the snapshot  yesterday  because no writer is named  in the blog post). That's really the heart of the story. Yesterday, you had a  limited, for-show opening. Sudarsan Raghavan and K.I. Ibrahim's "Six Years After Its Pillage,  Iraqi Museum to Reopen " (Washington Post ) reports puppet of the occupation Nouri al-Maliki  insists the 'opening' indicates an "embrace of democracy" -- embrace by who and  of what by whom? Democracy for invited guests only? It was an  opening of sorts, a one-day opening. It's all smoke and mirrors to establish  'progress' in Iraq. If we all agree to be stupid or lie, we can be Ad Melkert  and claim progress in Iraq (see yesterday's snapshot ).      Iraqis who can't find their loved ones wouldn't argue 'progress' in Iraq.  At the heart of the protests in Iraq has been the wives, mothers and daughers  whose husbands, sons and fathers have disappeared into the Iraqi 'justice'  system. Wednesday NPR's Isra' al Rubei'i  and Kelly McEvers (Morning Edition)  reported  on the women who take part in the Baghdad protests. (And  please note, the women can be found all over Iraq and have been protesting  throughout Iraq since January.) They speak with Umm Haidar whose son Haider was  taken away by US troops five years ago and she has searched for him ever since,  "All I want to know is if my son is dead or alive." McEvers notes the  women say "we've searched the prisons and morgues" and that they come to  Baghdad's Tahrir Square "as a last hope." Nouri did come up with a program to  help these women back in February.    KELLY MCEVERS:  Earlier this year, as uprisings around the region  toppled some leaders and forced others to announce reforms, the Iraqi government  said it would launch a new program to search for the missing. The plan was that  the Iraqi Army would take requests from families at a battalion headquarters  like this one. Then a joint civilian-military committee would search prison  rosters, hospitals, and lists from newly discovered mass graves. At this station  alone, some 600 families registered.     Unidentified Man: (Foreign language spoken)      MCEVERS: This soldier, who doesn't want to give his name, worked on  the new committee. He says the registration is now closed, and nothing has been  done with the list of the missing. The soldier says the program was simply a way  to placate anti-government protesters.   Unidentified Man: (Through translator) People who we received in  the beginning, are coming now and asking us, what did you do? And we tell them,  nothing. We couldn't find anyone.   A soldier states Nouri's 'plan'  was "simply a way to placate" and to  defuse the protests.  That's 'progress'?  The inability to name a Minister of  National Security, a Minister of Defense or even a Minister of Interior all  these months after becoming prime minister-designate is 'progress'?  (Those  posts were supposed to have been named within thirty days of Nouri being named  prime minister-designate, per the Iraqi Constitution.)   As the security ministries remain without ministers to head them, as  Political Stalemate II continues, violence has increased. Reuters notes  today's violence includes  1 government employee being shot dead in Kirkuk, a Najaf bombing injuring three  children, a Kirkuk roadside bombing claiming 1 life and leaving two more people  injured, and, dropping back to last night, a Mosul grenade attack on an Iraqi  military checkpoint which claimed the life of one soldier.  And ETAN  gets  the last word:  ETAN Urges Secretary Clinton to Condition Security Assistance to Indonesia  on Rights Contact: John M. Miller, etan@etan.org,+1-  917-690-4391
 July 20 - As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton  travelled to Bali, the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network (ETAN)  urged her to condition U.S. security assistance to Indonesia on real  improvements in human rights by Indonesia government and genuine accountability  for violations of human rights.
 "The restoration of assistance to Indonesia's notorious  Kopassus special forces announced a year ago should be  reversed," said John M. Miller, National Coordinator of ETAN. "Kopassus training  was meant to be the carrot to encourage respect for rights. There is no evidence  it has done so. U.S. law bars cooperation with military and police units with  such egregious human rights records. The U.S should set an example by following  it's own law."
 On the eve of Secretary Clinton's visit,  ETAN issued the following statement:
 
 In her February 2009 visit to  Indonesia, Secretary of State Clinton praised  democratic reforms since the fall of the U.S.-backed Suharto, saying "Indonesia  has experienced a great transformation in the last 10 years." While Indonesia  has made progress since the dark days of Suharto, crimes against humanity and  other violations of human rights continue. U.S. policy has largely focused on  narrow strategic and economic interests that have little to do with the  well-being of the Indonesian people. Meanwhile, progress has stalled. Human  rights remain under threat. The military continues to find ways to maintain its  influence. The pleas of the victims of human rights crimes in Timor-Leste, Aceh,  West Papua, and elsewhere in the archipelago are ignored. Senior figures  responsible for the worst abuses prosper.
 
 In recent years, the U.S. has provided substantial assistance to  both the Indonesian military and police. This assistance is said to come with  lessons on human rights. The human rights lessons are not being learned. People  see the police as abusers, not protectors and military impunity prevails.  Indonesia's security forces are learning is that U.S. will assist them no matter  how they behave.
 
 Over the past year, horrific videos and other reports of  torture, the burning of villages and other crimes offer graphic proof that the  people of West Papua and elsewhere continue to suffer at the hands of military  and police. Soldiers prosecuted for these and other incidents receive  light sentences.  Just this past week, four civilians,  a women and three children, were wounded when Indonesian troops shot into a hut  in the Puncak Jaya area of Papua.
 
 As many as 100 political prisoners  remain jailed: prosecuted and jailed for the peaceful expression of opinion. In  many regions, minority religious institutions are persecuted, often with the  active or tacit assistance of local security officials. Vigilante groups, like  the Islamic Defenders Front, seek to enforce their own extra-legal version of  morality, again with the backing of officials. Journalists, human rights  defenders and anti-corruption activists are threatened and occasionally killed. The organizers  of the 2004 poisoning of Indonesia's most prominent human rights lawyer, Munir,  remain free and seemingly above the law.
 
 In recent years, the U.S. has  provided substantial assistance  to both the Indonesian military and police. This assistance is said to come with  lessons on human rights. Lessons that are not being learned. People see the  police as abusers, not  protectors and military impunity prevails. Indonesia's security forces are  learning is that U.S. will assist them no matter how they behave.
 
 We urge  the U.S. to condition its security assistance on an end to human rights  violations and to impunity. The U.S. should heed the recommendation of  Timor-Leste's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in  Timor-Leste (CAVR), which urged nations to "regulate  military sales and cooperation with Indonesia more effectively and make such  support totally conditional on progress towards full democratisation, the  subordination of the military to the rule of law and civilian government, and  strict adherence with international human rights, including respect for the  right of self-determination." Indonesia does not yet meet this  standard.The U.S., as a permanent member of the UN  Security Council, should work to establish an international tribunal to bring to  justice the perpetrators of human rights crimes committed during Indonesia's  24-year occupation of Timor-Leste. This would provide a measure of justice to  the victims and their families and serve as a deterrent to future human rights  violators. A tribunal is supported by the many victims of these crimes and by  human rights advocates in Timor-Leste, Indonesia, the U.S., and  elsewhere.Finally, we urge Secretary Clinton to  apologize to the peoples of Indonesia and Timor-Leste for U.S. support for the  Suharto dictatorship. Her visit offers the U.S. a chance to decisively break  with past U.S. support for torture, disappearances, rape, invasion and illegal  occupation, extrajudicial murder environmental devastation. Clinton should offer  condolences to Suharto's many victims throughout the archipelago and support the  prosecution of those responsible.ETAN was founded in  1991 to advocate for self-determination for Indonesian-occupied Timor-Leste.  Since the beginning, ETAN has worked to condition U.S. military assistance to  Indonesia on respect for human rights and genuine reform. The U.S.-based  organization continues to advocate for democracy, justice and human rights for  Timor-Leste and Indonesia. For more information, see ETAN's web site:  http://www.etan.org.
 
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